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NOTES AND COMMENTS
WEAK MONOTONICITY CHARACTERIZES DETERMINISTIC
DOMINANT-STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION
BY SUSHIL BIKHCHANDANI, SHUROJIT CHATTERJI, RON LAVI,
AHUVA MU’ALEM, NOAM NISAN, AND ARUNAVA SEN1
We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional
types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compat-
ible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the
following: If changing one agent’s type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed)
changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in
utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must
be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.
KEYWORDS: Dominant-strategy implementation, multi-object auctions.
1. INTRODUCTION
WE CHARACTERIZE DOMINANT-STRATEGY INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY of de-
terministic social choice functions in a model with multidimensional types, pri-
vate values, and quasilinear preferences. We show that incentive compatibility
is characterized by a simple monotonicity property of the social choice func-
tion. This property, termed weak monotonicity, requires the following provi-
sion: If changing one agent’s type (while keeping the types of other agents
fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the result-
ing difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the
new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated
at his original type. In effect weak monotonicity requires that the social choice
function be sensitive to changes in differences in utilities.
It is well known that when agents have multidimensional types, character-
izations of incentive compatibility are complex. For one-dimensional types,
Myerson (1981) showed that a random allocation function in a single-object
auction is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if it is a subgradient of
a convex function, which is equivalent to the requirement that each buyer’s
probability of obtaining the object is nondecreasing in his type. In multidimen-
sional environments, although the subgradient condition is still necessary and
1This paper subsumes parts of “Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auc-
tions,” by Lavi, Mu’alem, and Nisan, and of “Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Unit Auctions,”
by Bikhchandani, Chatterji, and Sen. We are grateful to Liad Blumrosen, Joe Ostroy, Moritz
Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu, Dov Monderer, Motty Perry, Phil Reny, Amir Ronen, and
Rakesh Vohra for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to six referees and two co-editors
whose comments led to substantial improvements in this paper. Bikhchandani was supported by
National Science Foundation under Grant SES-0422317, and Lavi, Mu’alem, and Nisan were
supported by Israeli Science Foundation and USA–Israel Bi-National Science Foundation.
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sufficient for Bayesian incentive compatibility, it is not equivalent to a sim-
ple monotonicity requirement.2 The subgradient condition is equivalent to the
“cyclic-monotonicity” condition in Rochet (1987), which is difficult to interpret
and use.
Our contribution is to show that when the incentive-compatibility require-
ment is strengthened to dominant strategy and only deterministic mechanisms
are considered, then incentive compatibility in a multidimensional types set-
ting is characterized by weak monotonicity, which is a simple and intuitive
condition that generalizes the concept of a nondecreasing function from one
to multiple dimensions. As discussed in Section 5, the contrast between weak
monotonicity and cyclic monotonicity is the following: the latter is a require-
ment on every finite selection of type vectors from the domain, whereas weak
monotonicity is the same requirement, but only for every pair of type vectors.
Although cyclic monotonicity is usually stronger and more complicated than
weak monotonicity, in our setting the two turn out to be equivalent. Thus our
paper helps delineate the boundaries of multidimensional models that permit
a characterization that is a simple generalization of Myerson’s monotonicity
condition.
Although other types of monotonicity conditions have been used to char-
acterize dominant-strategy implementability, because we consider smaller
domains, these are not sufficient in our model. Maskin monotonicity is a char-
acterization for nonquasilinear settings such as voting models (see Muller and
Satterthwaite (1977) and Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979)). In qua-
silinear environments with a complete domain, Roberts (1979) showed that a
monotonicity condition called positive association of differences (PAD) is nec-
essary and sufficient for dominant-strategy incentive compatibility. Roberts’
complete-domain assumption rules out free disposal and the absence of al-
locative externalities, and therefore also all environments with private goods
such as auctions. In our environment, Roberts’ PAD condition imposes no re-
strictions because all social choice functions satisfy it. Weak monotonicity is the
appropriate characterization for the much more restrictive domain of prefer-
ences that we consider, one that permits private goods. Chung and Ely (2002)
give another characterization for restricted quasilinear environments, which
we discuss in Section 5.
Our simplification of the constraint set for incentive compatibility should be
helpful in applications such as finding a revenue-maximizing auction in the
class of deterministic dominant-strategy auctions. Our characterization also
bears upon applications where the mechanism designer is interested in effi-
ciency rather than revenue, such as finding a second-best, dominant-strategy,
budget-balanced, double auction. Furthermore, it is well known that, because
2See, for example, Rochet (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1988), Williams (1999), Krishna and
Perry (1997), Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996, 1999), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001),
Krishna and Maenner (2001), and Milgrom and Segal (2002).
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of its computational complexity, the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction is imprac-
tical for selling more than a small number of objects. Several papers investigate
computationally feasible (but inefficient) auctions in private-values settings
(see Nisan and Ronen (2000), Lehman, O’Callaghan, and Shoham (2002),
and Holzman and Monderer (2004)). Characterizing the set of incentive-
compatible auctions facilitates the selection of an auction that is computation-
ally feasible.
The notion of incentive compatibility in our paper is dominant strategy,
which is equivalent to requiring Bayesian incentive compatibility for all possi-
ble priors (see Ledyard (1978)). Thus, it is not necessary to assume that agents
have priors over the types of all agents (let alone mutual or common knowl-
edge of such priors) for the mechanisms considered here. This weakening of
common-knowledge assumptions is in the spirit of the Wilson doctrine (see
Wilson (1987)).
In our formulation, we take as primitive a preference order for each agent
over the set of outcomes. These orders may be null, partial, or complete,
and may differ across agents. We show that weak monotonicity character-
izes dominant-strategy implementability in two environments: (i) when the
underlying preference order is partial and a rich-domain assumption holds,
and (ii) when the preference order is complete and utilities are bounded. The
first environment includes multi-object auctions and the second includes multi-
unit auctions with diminishing marginal utilities as special cases. We first prove
results for single-agent models, with extensions to many agents being straight-
forward.
The paper is organized as follows. The characterization of incentive compat-
ibility for a single-agent model is developed in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4,
we extend this characterization to many agents. We discuss connections to pre-
vious literature in Section 5. The proofs are in the Appendix. A few related
examples and results are provided in the Supplement to this paper (Bikhchan-
dani et al. (2006)).
2. A SINGLE-AGENT MODEL
Let A= {a1 a2     aK} be a finite set of possible outcomes. We assume that
the agent has quasilinear preferences over outcomes and (divisible) money.
The agent’s type, which is his private information, determines his utility over
outcomes. The utility of an agent of type V over outcome a and money m is
U(amV )=U(aV )+m a ∈A
It is convenient to assume that the agent’s initial endowment of money is nor-
malized to zero and he can supply any (negative) quantity required. We will
sometimes write V (a) and V ′(a) instead of U(aV ) and U(aV ′), respectively.
The domain of V is D ⊆ K+ , with the kth coordinate of type V being V (ak),
this type’s utility for outcome ak.
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A social choice function f is a function from the agent’s report to an outcome
in the set A. (The social choice function is deterministic in that the agent’s re-
port is not mapped to a probability distribution on A.) As we are interested
in truth-telling social choice functions, by the revelation principle we restrict
attention to direct mechanisms. Thus, f :D → A. We assume, without loss of
generality, that f is onto A. A payment function p :D →  is a function from
the agent’s reported type to a money payment by the agent. A social choice
mechanism (fp) consists of a social choice function f and a payment func-
tion p.
A social choice mechanism is truth-telling if truthfully reporting his type is
optimal (i.e., is a dominant strategy) for the agent:
U(f(V )V )−p(V )≥U(f(V ′)V )−p(V ′) ∀V V ′ ∈D(1)
A social choice function f is truthful if there exists a payment function p such
that (fp) is truth-telling; p is said to implement f .
Consider the following restriction. A social choice function f is weakly
monotone (W-Mon) if for every V V ′,
U(f(V ′)V ′)−U(f(V )V ′)≥U(f(V ′)V )−U(f(V )V )(2)
If f satisfies the W-Mon requirement, then the difference in the agent’s utility
between f (V ′) and f (V ) at V ′ is greater than or equal to this difference at V .
Weak monotonicity is a simple and intuitive condition on social choice func-
tions. In effect, it is a requirement that the social choice function be sensitive
to changes in differences in utilities. It is easy to see that weak monotonicity is
a necessary condition for truth-telling:
LEMMA 1: If (fp) is a truth-telling social choice mechanism, then f is
W-Mon.
PROOF: Let (fp) be a truth-telling social choice mechanism. Consider two
types V and V ′ of the agent. By the optimality of truth-telling at V and V ′,
respectively, we have
U(f(V )V )−p(V )≥U(f(V ′)V )−p(V ′)
and
U(f(V ′)V ′)−p(V ′)≥U(f(V )V ′)−p(V )
These two inequalities imply that
U(f(V ′)V ′)−U(f(V )V ′) ≥ p(V ′)−p(V )
≥ U(f(V ′)V )−U(f(V )V )
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Hence f satisfies the W-Mon requirement. Q.E.D.
Next, we obtain conditions on D, the domain of the agent’s types, under
which weak monotonicity is sufficient for truth-telling.
3. SUFFICIENCY OF WEAK MONOTONICITY
If the domain of the agent’s types, D, is not large enough, then weak
monotonicity is not sufficient for truth-telling. This is clear from the follow-
ing example.
EXAMPLE 1: There are three outcomes: a1 a2, and a3. The agent’s type is
a vector that represents his utilities for these outcomes. The agent has three
possible types: V 1 = (05570), V 2 = (06085), and V 3 = (04075). That is,
V 1(a1) = 0, V 1(a2) = 55, and V 1(a3) = 70 and so on. The domain of types is
D= {V 1 V 2 V 3}.
The social choice function f (V 1) = a1, f (V 2) = a2, and f (V 3) = a3 is
W-Mon on the set D because
V 2(a2)− V 2(a1)= 60 − 0 ≥ 55 − 0 = V 1(a2)− V 1(a1)
V 3(a3)− V 3(a2)= 75 − 40 ≥ 85 − 60 = V 2(a3)− V 2(a2)
V 1(a1)− V 1(a3)= 0 − 70 ≥ 0 − 75 = V 3(a1)− V 3(a3)
However, there is no payment function that implements f . Suppose that the
agent pays p1 at report V 1, p2 at report V 2, and p3 at report V 3. Without
loss of generality, let p1 = 0. For truth-telling we must have p2 ≥ 55, else type
V 1 would report V 2. Similarly, p3 − p2 ≥ 25, else type V 2 would report V 3.
Therefore, we must have p3 ≥ 80. However, then type V 3 would report V 1.
Even if the domain of types is connected, weak monotonicity is not suffi-
cient for truthfulness. Let Dˆ be the sides of the triangle with corners V 1 V 2,
and V 3 defined above. Let [V iV j) denote the half-open line segment that
joins V i to V j . The allocation rule fˆ is as follows: fˆ (V ) = a1 ∀V ∈ [V 1 V 3),
fˆ (V ) = a2 ∀V ∈ [V 2 V 1), and fˆ (V ) = a3 ∀V ∈ [V 3 V 2). It may be verified
that fˆ satisfies weak monotonicity but there are no payments that induce truth-
telling under fˆ .
Requiring weak monotonicity on a larger domain (than in the example)
strengthens this condition. To this end, we define order-based preferences over
the possible outcomes.
Order-based domains
We restrict attention to domains D ⊆ K+ . In certain contexts, regardless of
his type, the agent has an order of preference over some of the outcomes in the
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set A. In a multi-object auction, for instance, where an outcome is the bundle
of objects allocated to the agent, if a ⊂ ak, then under free disposal it is natural
that the agent prefers ak to a and V (a)≤ V (ak) for all V ∈D. Therefore, we
take as a primitive the finite set of outcomes A and a (weak) order 
 on it.
This order may be null, partial, or complete.
A type V is consistent with respect to (A
) if ak 
 a implies V (ak) ≥
V (a). A domain of types D is consistent with respect to (A
) if every type
in D is consistent with respect to (A
). We will sometimes write domain D
on (A
) to mean D is consistent with respect to (A
).
If 
 is null, then D is an unrestricted domain in the sense that for any
aka ∈A, there may exist V V ′ ∈ D such that V (ak) > V (a) and V ′(ak) <
V ′(a). If, instead, 
 is a partial order, then D is a partially ordered domain:
for any aka ∈A, if ak 
 a, then V (ak)≥ V (a) for all V ∈D. If 
 is a com-
plete order, then D is a completely ordered domain: for any aka ∈ A, either
V (ak) ≥ V (a) for all V ∈ D or V (ak) ≤ V (a) for all V ∈ D, depending on
whether ak 
 a or ak  a.
Examples of order-based domains include the following situations:
(i) As already mentioned, in a multi-object auction, the set of out-
comes A is a list of possible subsets of objects that the agent might be allocated.
The order 
 is the partial order induced by set inclusion.
(ii) A multi-unit auction is a special case of a multi-object auction in which
all objects are identical. Let the outcomes be the number of objects allocated
to the agent. Thus, for any aka ∈ A, either ak ≤ a or a ≤ ak; accordingly
either ak  a or ak 
 a and 
 is a complete order.
(iii) Another special case is when the agent has assignment-model prefer-
ences over K − 1 heterogeneous objects. Let the outcome a1 denote no object
assigned to the agent and let ak+1, k= 12    K − 1, denote the assignment
of the kth object to the agent. The allocation of more than one object to the
agent is not permitted. The underlying order is ak 
 a1 for all k≥ 2 and ak 
 a
for all k≥ 2, k = .
In an auction, there is an outcome at which the agent does not get any ob-
ject; the utility of this outcome is 0 for all types of the agent. The proofs in
Section 3.2 (but not in Section 3.1) require the existence of such an outcome.
The following definitions will be needed in the sequel. The inverse of a social
choice function f is
Y(k)≡ {V ∈D|f (V )= ak}
where the dependence of Y on f is suppressed for notational simplicity. For
any k ∈ {12    K}, define
δk ≡ inf{V (ak)− V (a)|V ∈ Y(k)}(3)
Note that δkk = 0.
Next, we prove sufficiency of weak monotonicity for partially ordered do-
mains.
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3.1. Partially Ordered Domains
Recall that the set of outcomes is A = (a1 a2     aK). Throughout Sec-
tion 3.1 we make the following assumption on the domain of types.
RICH-DOMAIN ASSUMPTION: Let D be a domain of types on (A
). Then
D is rich if every V ∈ K+ that is consistent with (A
) belongs to D.
Thus, if 
 is null then D= K+ . If, instead, 
 is a partial order, then D is the
largest subset of K+ that satisfies inequalities V (ak)≥ V (a) whenever ak 
 a
for all aka ∈ A. It is easily verified that the formulations of the auction ex-
amples of the previous section admit rich domains.
Next, we define a payment function that implements a social choice func-
tion f that satisfies weak monotonicity on a rich domain. Relabeling the out-
comes if necessary, let aK be an outcome that is maximal under 
.3 Because
D is rich, for each a ∈A, there exists a V ∈D such that V (aK) > V (a). Con-
sider the payment function
pk ≡ −δKk (∀k= 12    K)(4)
That is, if the agent reports V ∈ Y(k), then the outcome ak is selected by f and
the agent pays pk. The next result shows that this payment function enforces
incentives between aK and any other outcome a.
LEMMA 2: Let f be a social choice function that is W-Mon. For any a ∈ A
and V ∈D,
(i) If V (a)−p < V (aK)−pK , then f (V ) = a.
(ii) If V (a)−p > V (aK)−pK , then f (V ) = aK .
This leads to the main result for partially ordered domains.
THEOREM 1: A social choice function on a rich domain is truthful if and only
if it is weakly monotone.
As already observed, the smaller the domain of types on which the social
choice function satisfies weak monotonicity, the weaker the restriction im-
posed by weak monotonicity. Therefore, next we investigate whether weak
monotonicity is sufficient for truth-telling when the domain is not rich, in
particular, when the domain is bounded. To obtain a sufficiency result with
smaller-domain assumptions, we make the stronger assumption that the un-
derlying order is complete.
3In a multi-object auction, aK is any maximal subset (with respect to set inclusion) in the range
of the mechanism. Thus, if the outcome at which all objects are allocated to the agent is in the
range of the mechanism, then this outcome is aK .
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3.2. Completely Ordered Domains
The order 
 on the set of outcomes is complete. That is, for any aka ∈A,
either ak 
 a or a 
 ak, but not both. (If all types of the agent are indif-
ferent between two outcomes, then we can combine these two outcomes into
one.) Thus, for any domain D consistent with (A
), either V (ak) ≥ V (a)
for all V ∈D or V (a)≥ V (ak) for all V ∈D. We label the outcomes such that
ak 
 ak−1. Define for each type V the marginal (or incremental) utility of the
kth outcome over the (k− 1)th outcome:
vk ≡ V (ak)− V (ak−1)≥ 0 (k= 12    K)
For notational simplicity, we have K+1 outcomes rather than K. Furthermore,
we assume that the utility of outcome a0 is the same for each type in D and we
normalize V (a0)≡ 0 ∀V ∈D.
A multi-unit auction has a completely ordered domain, where the number
of units allocated to the buyer is the outcome. Therefore, we denote the set of
outcomes as A= {012    K} (rather than {a0 a1     aK}). It is convenient
to define the agent’s type in terms of marginal utilities v = (v1 v2     vK) for
each successive unit (rather than total utilities V = (V (1)V (2)     V (K))).
The social choice and payment functions map marginal utilities to an outcome
k = 01    K and to payments, respectively. The inverse social choice func-
tion Y(·) maps integers k= 01    K to subsets of types (in marginal utility
space).
In this setting, the W-Mon inequality (2) may be restated as follows. A social
choice rule f is W-Mon if for every v and v′,
if f (v′) > f(v) then
f (v′)∑
=f (v)+1
v′ ≥
f (v′)∑
=f (v)+1
v(5)
Suppose that f is the allocation rule of a multi-unit auction and that the agent
is allocated more units by the mechanism when his (reported) type is v′ than
when it is v. If f is W-Mon, then the agent’s valuation at v′ for the additional
units allocated at v′ is at least as large as his valuation at v.
The domain in Example 1 is completely ordered, but weak monotonicity is
not sufficient for truthfulness; therefore, we need a larger domain. The follow-
ing assumption encompasses both bounded utilities and diminishing marginal
utilities.4
BOUNDED-DOMAIN ASSUMPTION: There exist constants v¯k ∈ (0∞), k =
12    K, such that the domain of agent types,D, satisfies either of the following
statements:
4The domain of types is referred to by D rather than D, because types now specify marginal
utilities rather than total utilities.
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A. D =∏Kk=1[0 v¯k].
B. D is the convex hull of points (v¯1 v¯2     v¯k−1 v¯k0    0), k = 0
1    K.
The assumption that v¯k < ∞ for all k is not essential, but does simplify the
proofs. Domain assumption A does not restrict the marginal utilities to be de-
creasing (or increasing). We do not specifically assume that v¯k ≥ v¯k+1, but when
this inequality holds for all k and domain assumption B is satisfied, then we
have diminishing marginal utilities; that is, vk ≥ vk+1 for all v ∈D. Under do-
main assumption B, v= (v1 v2     vK) ∈D if and only if 0 ≤ v ≤ v¯ ∀ and
v
v¯
≥ v+1
v¯+1
(= 12    K − 1)(6)
We note that a straightforward modification in the proofs extends our results
to the case of increasing marginal utilities, i.e., when D is the convex hull
of points (00    0 v¯k v¯k+1     v¯K), k= 01    K. The assumption of in-
creasing marginal utilities obtains when the objects are complements, such as
airwave spectrum rights.
Recalling the definition in (3), note that
δkk−1 = inf{vk|v ∈ Y(k)}(7)
δk−1k = −sup{vk|v ∈ Y(k− 1)}
Next, a “tie-breaking at boundaries” assumption is invoked to deal with dif-
ficulties at the boundary of the domain.
TIE-BREAKING AT BOUNDARIES (TBB): A social choice function f satisfies
TBB if both of the following conditions hold:
(i) vk > 0 for all v ∈ Y(k),
(ii) vk < v¯k for all v ∈ Y(k− 1).
Consider TBB(i). If δkk−1 > 0, then TBB(i) imposes no restriction. If,
instead, δkk−1 = 0, then there exists a sequence vn ∈ Y(k) such that
limn→∞vnk = 0; the existence of a point v ∈ Y(k) at which vk = δkk−1 = 0 is
precluded by TBB(i). Similarly, TBB(ii) imposes no restriction if −δk−1k < v¯k
and if, instead, −δk−1k = v¯k, it requires that for any v ∈ Y(k − 1), we have
vk < v¯k.
First, we prove sufficiency of weak monotonicity and TBB (Lemmas 3 and 4)
for truth-telling. We then show (Lemma 5) that (i) for any W-Mon social
choice function f , there exists a social choice function f ′ that satisfies weak
monotonicity and TBB, and agrees with f almost everywhere, and (ii) the
money payments that truthfully implement f ′ also truthfully implement f .
The next lemma will be used to define payment functions that implement f .
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LEMMA 3: Let f be a social choice function on a completely ordered, bounded
domain. If f satisfies weak monotonicity and TBB, then v¯k ≥ δkk−1 = −δk−1k ≥ 0
for all k.
It is clear from (7) that v ≥ δ−1 for any v ∈ Y() and v′ ≤ −δ−1 for
any v′ ∈ Y( − 1). This, together with Lemma 3, implies that v′ ≤ −δ−1 =
δ−1 ≤ v. In other words, the hyperplane v = δ−1 weakly separates Y()
and Y(− 1). Hence, for any payment function that implements f , the differ-
ence in the payments at points in Y() and Y(− 1) must be δ−1. Therefore,
consider the payment function
pk ≡
{∑k
=1 δ−1 if = 12    K,
0 if = 0.(8)
The preceding discussion implies that, under this payment function, any type
v ∈ Y() has no incentive to misreport his type in Y(− 1) or Y(+ 1). That
the agent has no incentive to misreport his type under this payment function is
proved in the next lemma.
LEMMA 4: A social choice function on a completely ordered, bounded domain
is truthful if it satisfies weak monotonicity and TBB.
The next lemma allows one to dispense with TBB in the sufficient condition
for truth-telling.
LEMMA 5: If a social choice mechanism f satisfies weak monotonicity, then
there exists an allocation mechanism f ′ that satisfies weak monotonicity and
TBB such that f (v) = f ′(v) for almost all v ∈ D. Moreover, the payment func-
tion p′k defined as in (8) with respect to f
′ truthfully implements f .
Lemma 5 assures us that, given any social choice function f that satisfies
weak monotonicity, we can construct another social choice function f ′ that is
W-Mon and TBB. By Lemma 4, f ′ is truthful and by Lemma 5, the payment
function that implements f ′ also implements f . Thus, weak monotonicity is
sufficient for truth-telling. This leads to the main result for completely ordered
domains.
THEOREM 2: A social choice function on a completely ordered bounded do-
main is truthful if and only if it is weakly monotone.
An alternative characterization for the single-agent completely ordered do-
main model is through the payment function rather than the social choice
function. Consider a multi-unit auction with one buyer. The allocation rule
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“induced” by any increasing payment function (pk ≥ pk−1 ≥ 0) is imple-
mentable. We note that this characterization becomes considerably more com-
plex when one considers two or more buyers. This is because each buyer’s
payment function will, in general, depend on others’ reported types and for
each vector of types, it must be verified that the induced allocation rule does
not distribute more units than are available. Our characterization based on
weak monotonicity is easily generalized to multi-agent settings, both for com-
pletely ordered and partially ordered domains.
4. EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE AGENTS
We extend the results of the single-agent model to multiple agents, with each
agent having private values over the possible outcomes. For concreteness, we
use the setup of Section 3.1; an identical argument extends the results of Sec-
tion 3.2.
There are i = 12     n agents and the finite set of outcomes is A =
{a1 a2     aL}. Agent i’s type is denoted by Vi = (Vi1 Vi2     Vi     ViL),
where each Vi ∈ Di ⊆ L+. The characteristics of all the agents are denoted
by V = (V1 V2     Vi     Vn).5 The private-values assumption is that each
agent’s utility function depends only on his type. Thus, when the types are
V = (Vi V−i), agent i’s utility over the outcome a and m units of money is
Ui(am (Vi V−i))=Ui(aVi)+ma ∈A.
The outcome set A is endowed with (partial) orders 
i, i = 12     n, one
for each agent. The domain of agents’ types, D = D1 ×D2 × · · · ×Dn, is con-
sistent with (A
1
2    
n) if each Di, the domain of agent i’s types, is
consistent with (A
i). Furthermore, D is rich if each Di is rich (as defined in
Section 3.1).
In an auction, A represents the set of possible assignments of objects to
agents (buyers). If buyer i cares only about the objects allocated to him, then
the partial order 
i is determined by set inclusion on the respective alloca-
tions to buyer i at aa′ ∈A. Thus, a∼i a′ (i.e., Ui(aVi)=Ui(a′ Vi) ∀Vi ∈Di)
whenever a and a′ allocate the same bundle of objects to buyer i.
A social choice function f is a mapping from the domain of all agents’ (re-
ported) types onto A, f :D→A. For each agent i there is a payment function
pi :D → . Let p = (p1p2    pn). The pair (fp) is a social choice mech-
anism. A social choice mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if
truthfully reporting one’s type is a dominant strategy for each agent. That is,
for every i, ViV ′i , V−i,
Ui(f (Vi V−i) Vi)−pi(Vi V−i)≥Ui(f (V ′i  V−i) Vi)−pi(V ′i  V−i)(9)
5In a departure from the notation of Section 3, V now refers to a profile of utilities for n agents
rather than for a single agent.
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A social choice function f is dominant-strategy implementable if there exist pay-
ment functions p such that (fp) is dominant-strategy incentive compatible.
The following definition generalizes weak monotonicity to a multiple-agent
setting. A social choice function f is weakly monotone (W-Mon) if, for every i,
ViV
′
i , V−i,
Ui(f (V
′
i  V−i) V
′
i )−Ui(f (Vi V−i) V ′i )(10)
≥Ui(f (V ′i  V−i) Vi)−Ui(f (Vi V−i) Vi)
Observe that the requirement of dominant strategy, (9), is the same as requir-
ing truth-telling (i.e., (1)) for each agent i, for each value of V−i. Furthermore,
(10) is equivalent to requiring (2) for each agent i, for each value of V−i. Thus,
Theorem 1 (and similarly also Theorem 2) generalizes:
THEOREM 3: (i) A social choice function on a rich domain is dominant-
strategy implementable if and only if it is weakly monotone.
(ii) A social choice function on a completely ordered, bounded domain is
dominant-strategy implementable if and only if it is weakly monotone.
5. RELATIONSHIP TO EARLIER WORK
In his seminal paper, Myerson (1981) showed that a necessary and sufficient
condition for Bayesian incentive compatibility of a single-object auction is that
each buyer’s probability of receiving the object is nondecreasing in his reported
valuation.6 Several authors, including Rochet (1987), McAfee and McMillan
(1988), Williams (1999), Krishna and Perry (1997), Jehiel, Moldovanu, and
Stacchetti (1996, 1999), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), Krishna and Maenner
(2001), and Milgrom and Segal (2002), have extended Myerson’s analysis to
obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for Bayesian incentive-compatible
mechanisms in the presence of multidimensional types. These results are eas-
ily adapted to dominant-strategy mechanisms.
To place our results in the context of this earlier work, let G be a (random)
social choice function that maps the domain of agents’ types D to a probabil-
ity distribution over the set of outcomes A = {a1 a2     aL}. Thus, for each
V ∈D, G(V ) = (g1(V )g2(V )     g(V )     gL(V )) is a probability distri-
bution. Recall that the payment functions are p = (p1p2    pn). A social
choice mechanism (Gp) induces the following payoff function for agent i:
Πi(Vi V−i)≡G(ViV−i) · Vi −pi(Vi V−i)
6Myerson characterized Bayesian incentive compatibility when agents’ types are one dimensional;
simple modifications to his proofs yield a similar characterization for dominant-strategy incen-
tive compatibility. Myerson’s characterization coincides with weak monotonicity applied to one-
dimensional types.
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where x · y denotes the dot product of two vectors x and y . Dominant-strategy
incentive compatibility implies that for all i, Vi, V ′i , V−i,
Πi(Vi V−i)≥G(V ′i  V−i) · Vi −pi(V ′i  V−i)(11)
=Πi(V ′i  V−i)+G(V ′i  V−i) · (Vi − V ′i )
⇒ Πi(Vi V−i)= max
V ′i
{G(V ′i  V−i) · Vi −pi(V ′i  V−i)}
Because Πi(· V−i) is the maximum of a family of linear functions, it is a convex
function of Vi. Furthermore, for each i and V−i, G(· V−i) is a subgradient of
Πi(· V−i). This leads to the following characterization: A social choice function
G is dominant-strategy implementable if and only if for each V−i, G(· V−i) is a
subgradient of a convex function from Di to .
A function G(· V−i) :Di → L, Di ⊆ L, is cyclically monotone if for every
finite selection V ji ∈Di j = 12    m, with V m+1i = V 1i ,
m∑
j=1
V
j
i · [G(V ji  V−i)−G(V j+1i  V−i)] ≥ 0(12)
A function is a subgradient of a convex function if and only if it is cyclically
monotone (Rockafellar (1970, p. 238)). Thus, cyclic monotonicity of the social
choice function also characterizes dominant-strategy implementability. The ra-
tionalizability condition of Rochet (1987) generalizes the cyclic-monotonicity
characterization of incentive compatibility to settings where the utility function
is possibly nonlinear.
Weak monotonicity is a weaker condition than cyclic monotonicity. To see
this, note that if m= 2, then (12) may be restated as [G(V ′i  V−i)−G(ViV−i)] ·
(V ′i − Vi) ≥ 0 for all ViV ′i . This is the same as (10), with Ui(G(Vi V−i) Vi) =
G(ViV−i) · Vi, etc. Thus, weak monotonicity requires the inequality in (12)
only for every pair of types, whereas Rochet’s cyclic-monotonicity condition
requires this inequality for all finite selections of types.
For one-dimensional types, cyclic monotonicity is equivalent to weak mono-
tonicity, which is equivalent to a nondecreasing subgradient function
(Rockafellar (1970, p. 240)). Hence, Myerson’s characterization of incen-
tive compatibility as a nondecreasing allocation function. Weak monotonicity,
which generalizes the concept of a nondecreasing function, does not charac-
terize incentive compatibility in a multidimensional setting with random mech-
anisms; the more complex condition of cyclic monotonicity is needed. Our
contribution is to show that when one restricts attention to deterministic social
choice functions, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility is characterized by
weak monotonicity.
Although our characterization is significantly simpler, the restriction to de-
terministic mechanisms may be an important limitation. Manelli and Vincent
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(2003) and Thanassoulis (2004) show that a multiproduct monopolist can
strictly increase profits by using a random, rather than deterministic, mecha-
nism. Example S1 in the Supplement establishes that, for random social choice
functions, weak monotonicity is not sufficient for dominant-strategy imple-
mentability.7 Whether there is an intuitive condition, which in conjunction with
weak monotonicity is sufficient for incentive compatibility of random social
choice functions, is an open question.
Chung and Ely (2002) obtained a characterization of dominant-strategy
implementability of random social choice functions that they call pseudo-
efficiency. When restricted to deterministic social choice functions, pseudo-
efficiency requires that there exist real-valued functions wi(aVi) such that,
for each V ,
f (V ) ∈ arg max
a∈A
(
Ui(aVi)+wi(aV−i)
) ∀ i
For deterministic social choice functions over a finite set of outcomes, weak
monotonicity must be equivalent to pseudo-efficiency. The definition of the
latter involves an existential quantifier, which makes it hard to verify.
Roberts (1979) characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy mechanisms
in quasilinear environments with a “complete” domain. Roberts identifies a
condition called positive association of differences (PAD), which is satisfied by a
social choice function f , for all V = (V1 V2     Vn) and V ′ = (V ′1  V ′2      V ′n),
if Ui(f (V )V ′i )−Ui(aV ′i ) > Ui(f (V )Vi)−Ui(aVi)(13)
∀a = f (V ) ∀ i
then f (V ′)= f (V )
An allocation rule f is an affine maximizer if there exist constants γi ≥ 0, with
at least one γi > 0, and a function U0 :A→  such that
f (V ) ∈ arg max
a∈A
(
U0(a)+
n∑
i=1
γiUi(aVi)
)

Roberts (1979) shows that f is a (deterministic) dominant-strategy mechanism
if and only if f satisfies PAD if and only if f is an affine maximizer.
What is the relationship between Roberts’ work and ours? The fundamen-
tal difference is that Roberts assumes an unrestricted domain of preferences
while we operate in a restricted domain. In particular, Roberts requires that
for all a ∈ A, any real number α, and any agent i, there exists a type Vi of
agent i such that Ui(aVi) = α. Thus, taking (A
1
2    
n) and the do-
main of types as primitives of the two models, in Roberts’ model 
i is a null
7We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this example.
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order and Di = L for each agent i, whereas we allow each 
i to be a nonnull
(even complete) order and the corresponding Di to be a strict subset of L+. We
note that Di = L, for all i, is essential for Roberts’ results. Thus, an auction or
any mechanism that allocates (private) goods does not satisfy Roberts’ domain
assumptions because they preclude free disposal and no externalities in con-
sumption. Indeed, in an auction with two or more buyers, PAD is vacuous in
that all mechanisms satisfy PAD.8 Weak monotonicity, however, is not vacuous
in this setting and is the appropriate condition for incentive compatibility.9 Be-
cause a smaller domain (than Roberts’) is sufficient for our characterization,
one may suspect that weak monotonicity is stronger than PAD. This is proved
in Lemma S1 in the Supplement. An important difference between these two
conditions is that PAD imposes restrictions on the social choice function only
for changes in types of all players, whereas weak monotonicity imposes restric-
tions for changes in one player’s type.10 Thus, weak monotonicity and PAD are
not equivalent. Furthermore, because of the domain restrictions inherent in
our model, our result is not a consequence of Roberts’ characterization.
It may be useful conceptually to draw an approximate parallel with the
results on dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in various domains. Ac-
cording to the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, dominant-strategy imple-
mentability is equivalent to dictatorship in an unrestricted domain (subject
to a range assumption). In the quasilinear model (with otherwise unrestricted
domain), Roberts showed that dominant-strategy implementability, PAD, and
the existence of affine maximizers are equivalent. In the more restricted eco-
nomic environments of auctions, where agents care only about their private
consumption, the equivalence of these three concepts breaks down. The do-
main restrictions inherent in auctions imply that the class of dominant-strategy
incentive-compatible allocation rules is smaller than those that satisfy PAD
and larger than the set of affine maximizers. If PAD is strengthened to weak
monotonicity, then we recover equivalence between dominant-strategy imple-
mentability and weak monotonicity.11 Although it is stronger than PAD, weak
monotonicity is much weaker than cyclic monotonicity, which has been used
to characterize incentive compatibility in multidimensional settings (Rochet
(1987)).
8Let a differ from f (V ) in the allocation to exactly one buyer. Then the hypothesis in (13) is false
because the strict inequality holds for at most one and not for all buyers.
9In our search for conditions that might be necessary and sufficient on even smaller domains than
considered here, we examined two conditions that strengthen weak monotonicity in a natural way.
However, neither of these two conditions is necessary. See Example S3 in the Supplement.
10As already noted, in multi-agent models PAD does not imply weak monotonicity. Example S2
in the Supplement presents a single-agent example in which a social choice function satisfies PAD
but not weak monotonicity; this mechanism is, of course, not truth-telling.
11Weak monotonicity by itself does not imply affine maximization. Lavi, Mu’alem, and Nisan
(2003) identify an additional property that, together with weak monotonicity, implies affine max-
imization.
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APPENDIX
The following lemma is used in the proofs.
LEMMA 6: For any social choice function f and aka ar ∈A we have:
(i) If ak 
 a, then δrk ≤ δr.
(ii) Weak monotonicity implies that δk ≥ −δk.
PROOF: (i) Because V (ak) ≥ V (a) for all V , including V ∈ Y(r), we have
V (ar)− V (ak)≤ V (ar)− V (a), ∀V ∈ Y(r). Therefore, δrk ≤ δr.
(ii) By weak monotonicity, V (ak) − V (a) ≥ V ′(ak) − V ′(a) ∀V ∈ Y(k),
V ′ ∈ Y(). Thus,
δk = inf{V (ak)− V (a)|V ∈ Y(k)}
≥ sup{V (ak)− V (a)|V ∈ Y()}
= −inf{V (a)− V (ak)|V ∈ Y()} = −δk Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: We first show that pk is finite. Clearly, pK = 0. If
aK 
 ak, then δKk ≥ 0 and pk ≤ 0. If aK 
 ak, k = K, then select V ′ ∈ Y(k).
Weak monotonicity implies that ∞> V (aK)−V (ak)≥ V ′(aK)−V ′(ak) >−∞
for any V ∈ Y(K), and therefore −δKk and hence pk are finite.
(i) By definition, pK = 0 and p = −δK. Therefore, V (a) − V (aK) <
−δK ≤ δK , where the second inequality follows from Lemma 6(ii). The de-
finition of δK implies that f (V ) = a.
(ii) In the other direction, V (aK) − V (a) < pK − p = δK implies
f (V ) = aK . Q.E.D.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 1: In view of Lemma 1, we need only show suffi-
ciency of weak monotonicity. In particular, we show that the payment func-
tion defined in (4) truthfully implements any social choice function f that
is W-Mon. Suppose to the contrary that there exist k∗k, and V ∈ Y(k∗)
such that V (ak∗) − pk∗ < V (ak) − pk. Lemma 2(i) and (ii) imply that k = K
and k∗ = K, respectively (else it would contradict V ∈ Y(k∗)). Furthermore,
Lemma 2(i) implies that V (ak∗) − pk∗ ≥ V (aK) − pK (= V (aK)). Choose a
γ > 0 and a small enough ε > 0 such that
V (ak∗)+ ε−pk∗ < V (aK)+ γ−pK < V (ak)−pk
Note that γ > ε. Define T = {ak∗} ∪ {a ∈A|a 
 ak∗ and V (a)= V (ak∗)}. Let
V ′ be the type
V ′(ar)≡
{
V (ar)+ ε if ar ∈ T \ {aK},
V (ar)+ γ if ar = aK,
V (ar) otherwise.
We verify the consistency of V ′ with 
. If a′ 
 a and a ∈ T , a′ /∈ T , a′ = aK ,
then select ε > 0 small enough so that V ′(a′)= V (a′)≥ V (a)+ ε= V ′(a).
If aK 
 a, a ∈ T , then as γ > ε, we have V ′(aK) ≥ V ′(a) if V (aK) ≥ V (a).
Furthermore, aK was chosen so that a 
 aK for any  =K.
The consistency of V ′ and the rich-domain assumption imply that V ′ ∈ D.
By Lemma 6(i), pk∗ ≤ p for any a ∈ T . Because V ′(a)= V ′(ak∗) for all a ∈
T \ {aK}, we have
V ′(a)−p ≤ V ′(ak∗)−pk∗ < V ′(aK)−pK ∀a ∈ T \ {aK}
Thus, ak /∈ T and Lemma 2(i) implies that f (V ′) = a for any  ∈ T \ {aK}.
Because V ′(aK) − pK < V ′(ak) − pk, we have f (V ′) = aK by Lemma 2(ii).
Thus, f (V ′)= ak′ /∈ T ∪ {aK}. However, then
0 = V ′(ak′)− V (ak′) < V ′(ak∗)− V (ak∗)= ε
which violates weak monotonicity. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: By Lemma 6(ii) and the fact that v¯k ≥ vk ≥ 0 for all
v ∈D, we have v¯k ≥ δkk−1 ≥ −δk−1k ≥ 0.
Let vk ≡ (v¯1 v¯2     v¯k0    0) for any k = 012    K (with v0 ≡
(00    0)). Observe that under either bounded-domain assumption A or B,
vk ∈ D. Thus, vk ∈ Y(q) for some q = 01    K. The assumption TBB(i)
implies that vk /∈ Y(q) for any q > k, and TBB(ii) implies that vk /∈ Y(q)
for any q < k. Therefore, vk ∈ Y(k). Next, let v(t) = (1 − t)vk−1 + tvk,
t ∈ [01], be a point on the straight line joining vk and vk−1, k ≥ 1. Observe
that v(t) = (v¯1     v¯k−1 tv¯k0    0) ∈ D ∀ t ∈ [01]. Thus, v(t) ∈ Y(q) for
some q. The assumption TBB implies that v(t) ∈ Y(k − 1) ∪ Y(k). Because
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vk(t)= tv¯k increases in t, there exists a t∗ ∈ [01] such that v(t) ∈ Y(k− 1) for
all t < t∗ and v(t) ∈ Y(k) for all t > t∗. Thus,
t∗v¯k = lim
t↑t∗
vk(t)≤ −δk−1k ≤ δkk−1 ≤ lim
t↓t∗
vk(t)= t∗v¯k
Hence, δkk−1 = −δk−1k. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4: Weak monotonicity implies that
if
q∑
=f (v)+1
v′ <
q∑
=f (v)+1
v ∀q > f(v) then f (v′)≤ f (v);(14)
if
f (v)∑
=q+1
v′ >
f(v)∑
=q+1
v ∀q < f(v) then f (v′)≥ f (v)(15)
Observe that if v′ and v, satisfy the hypotheses in (14) and (15), then f (v′) =
f (v).
First, we prove that for any k= 012    K,
{
v ∈D
∣∣∣ k∑
=q
v ≥
k∑
=q
δ−1 ∀q≤ k
q∑
=k+1
v ≤
q∑
=k+1
δ−1 ∀q > k
}
(16)
⊆ cl[Y(k)]
There are two cases to consider. Note that Case B below arises only if domain
assumption B holds and (6) is violated by (δ10 δ21     δKK−1).
CASE A—(δ10 δ21     δKK−1) ∈ D: Consider the point vˆk(ε) = (δ10 + ε1
    δkk−1 + εkδk+1k − εk+1     δK − εK), where ε1 ε2     εK satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions:
(i) If [q≤ k and δqq−1 = v¯q] or [q > k and δqq−1 = 0], then εq = 0.
(ii) If [q≤ k and δqq−1 < v¯q] or [q > k and δqq−1 > 0], then εq > 0.
Because (δ10 δ21     δKK−1) ∈ D, there exist ε1 ε2     εK satisfying
(i) and (ii) above such that vˆk(ε) ∈ D. (Under domain assumption B, the
εq’s must be chosen to ensure that vˆk(ε) satisfies (6).) Consider any q < k. If
δq+1q < v¯q+1 then as vˆkq+1(ε) > δq+1q, we know that vˆ
k(ε) /∈ Y(q). If, instead,
δq+1q = v¯q+1, then (as εq+1 = 0) we have vˆkq+1(ε) = v¯q+1. Thus, TBB(ii) im-
plies that vˆk(ε) /∈ Y(q). Similarly, TBB(i) implies that vˆk(ε) /∈ Y(q) for q > k.
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Hence vˆk(ε) ∈ Y(k). Therefore, (14) and (15) imply that12
{
v ∈D
∣∣∣ k∑
=q
v >
k∑
=q
(δ−1 + ε) ∀q≤ k
q∑
=k+1
v <
q∑
=k+1
(δ−1 − ε)∀q > k
}
⊂ Y(k)
One can construct a sequence (εn1 ε
n
2     ε
n
K)→ 0 such that vˆk(εn) ∈D. Tak-
ing limits as εn → 0, we get
{
v ∈D
∣∣∣ k∑
=q
v >
k∑
=q
δ−1 ∀q≤ k
q∑
=k+1
v <
q∑
=k+1
δ−1∀q > k
}
⊂ Y(k)
which in turn implies (16).
CASE B —(δ10 δ21     δKK−1) /∈D: For each k= 012    K, define
vk(ε)=
{
v
∣∣∣vq = max
[
vq+1
v¯q
v¯q+1
 δqq−1 + εq
]
 ∀q < k
δkk−1 + εk ≤ vk ≤ v¯k
vq = min
[
vq−1
v¯q
v¯q−1
 δqq−1 − εq
]
 ∀q > k
}

Any v ∈ vk(ε) satisfies (6). Thus, provided ε1 ε2     εK satisfy (i) and (ii) de-
fined in Case A, and are small enough, vk(ε) ⊂ D (= ⋃Kq=0 Y(q)). For any
v ∈ vk(ε), we have vq ≥ δqq−1 + εq for any q ≤ k; thus vk(ε) ∩ Y(q − 1) = ∅.
Similarly, for any q > k, vk(ε) ∩ Y(q) = ∅. Thus, vk(ε) ⊂ Y(k) for small
enough ε’s. From (14) and (15) applied to each v ∈ vk(ε), we know that (with
12If for some q≤ k, δ−1 = v¯ for all = qq+ 1    k, then the corresponding strict inequality
in the set on the left-hand side is replaced by a weak inequality. A similar change is made if for
some q > k, δ−1 = 0 for all  = qq + 1    k. In either case, (i) implies that ε = 0 in the
relevant range. This ensures that the set on the left-hand side is nonempty; the inclusion of this
set in Y(k) is implied by TBB together with (14) and (15).
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the qualification in footnote 12)
{
v ∈D
∣∣∣vk > δkk−1 + εk
k∑
=q
v > δkk−1 + εk +
k−1∑
=q
max
[
v+1
v¯
v¯+1
 δ−1 + ε
]
 ∀q < k
q∑
=k+1
v <
q∑
=k+1
min
[
v−1
v¯
v¯−1
 δ−1 − ε
]
 ∀q > k
}
⊂ Y(k)
Taking limits as (ε1 ε2     εK)→ 0, we see that
{
v ∈D
∣∣∣vk > δkk−1
k∑
=q
v > δkk−1 +
k−1∑
=q
max
[
v+1
v¯
v¯+1
 δ−1
]
 ∀q < k
q∑
=k+1
v <
q∑
=k+1
min
[
v−1
v¯
v¯−1
 δ−1
]
∀q > k
}
⊆ Y(k)
and, therefore,
{
v ∈D
∣∣∣vk ≥ δkk−1
k∑
=q
v ≥ δkk−1 +
k−1∑
=q
max
[
v+1
v¯
v¯+1
 δ−1
]
 ∀q < k
q∑
=k+1
v ≤
q∑
=k+1
min
[
v−1
v¯
v¯−1
 δ−1
]
 ∀q > k
}
⊆ cl[Y(k)]
That this last set inclusion is equivalent to (16) follows from the observation
that (6) implies that if
δkk−1 +
k−1∑
=q
max
[
v+1
v¯
v¯+1
 δ−1
]
>
k∑
=q
v ≥
k∑
=q
δ−1
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for some q < k or if
k∑
=q+1
min
[
v−1
v¯
v¯−1
 δ−1
]
<
k∑
=q+1
v ≤
k∑
=q+1
δ−1
for some q > k, then v /∈D. This establishes (16) for Case B.
Next, suppose that the set inclusion in (16) is strict. In particular, there
exists k, v ∈ cl[Y(k)] such that ∑k=q′ v < ∑k=q′ δ−1 for some q′ < k.
(From the definition of δkk−1 we know that q′ = k.) We may assume with-
out loss of generality that
∑k
=q v ≥
∑k
=q δ−1 ∀q = q′ + 1    k and that
v ∈ Y(k). (If v ∈ cl[Y(k)] \ Y(k), then there exists v′ ∈ Y(k), v′ close to v,
such that
∑k
=q′ v
′
 <
∑k
=q′ δ−1.) Therefore, vq′ < δq′q′−1 ≤ v¯q′ and
∑q
=q′ v <∑q
=q′ δ−1 ∀q = q′ q′ + 1    k. Consider the point vˆ ≡ (v¯1 v¯2     v¯q′−1
vq′ + εˆ vq′+1     vk0    0), where εˆ > 0 is small enough that vˆ ∈ D and∑q
=q′ vˆ <
∑q
=q′ δ−1 ∀q = q′ q′ + 1    k. Thus, (16) implies that vˆ ∈
cl[Y(q′ − 1)]. Suppose that vˆ ∈ Y(q′ − 1). However, this violates (5) because∑k
=q′ vˆ >
∑k
=q′ v and v ∈ Y(k). If, instead, vˆ ∈ cl[Y(q′ −1)] \Y(q′ −1), then
there exists v∗ ∈ Y(q′ − 1) that is arbitrarily close to vˆ and (5) is violated. Thus,
for any v ∈ cl[Y(k)] we have ∑k=q v ≥∑k=q δ−1 ∀q ≤ k. A similar proof es-
tablishes that if v ∈ cl[Y(k)] then ∀q > k, ∑q=k+1 v ≤∑q=k+1 δ−1. Therefore,
the set inclusion in (16) can be replaced by an equality, i.e.,
cl[Y(k)] =
{
v ∈D
∣∣∣ k∑
=q
v ≥
k∑
=q
δ−1 ∀q≤ k(17)
q∑
=k+1
v ≤
q∑
=k+1
δ−1 ∀q > k
}

For any v ∈ Y(k) and any q < k,
k∑
=1
v −
k∑
=1
δ−1 ≥
q∑
=1
v −
q∑
=1
δ−1(18)
⇐⇒
k∑
=q+1
v ≥
k∑
=q+1
δ−1
The last inequality follows from (17). Thus, (18) is true; when v ∈ Y(k), the
agent cannot increase his payoffs by reporting a type v′ ∈ Y(q), q < k. Sim-
ilarly, (18) is true for q > k. Thus, the payment function pk defined in (8)
implements f . Q.E.D.
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PROOF OF LEMMA 5: Before describing a procedure that converts f to an f ′
with the stated properties, we need the following result.13
CLAIM: Let f be an allocation rule that is W-Mon but not TBB. That is,
there exist vk ∈ Y(k) and vk−1 ∈ Y(k − 1) such that either vkk = vk−1k = 0 or
vkk = vk−1k = v¯k. Define a new allocation rule that is identical to f except that:
(i) If vkk = vk−1k = 0, then allocate k− 1 (instead of k) units at vk.
(ii) If vkk = vk−1k = v¯k, then allocate k (instead of k− 1) units at vk−1.
Then the new allocation rule is W-Mon.
PROOF: (i) Suppose that vkk = vk−1k = 0. At vk the buyer is allocated k − 1
units in the new allocation rule. Because f is W-Mon, all we need to check is
that vk satisfies W-Mon inequalities in the new allocation rule. Observe that
0 = δkk−1 = vkk ≤ vk ∀v ∈ Y(k). Thus vk satisfies the W-Mon inequalities with
respect to all v ∈ Y(k). Therefore, we need to show that for any v ∈ Y(q),
q = kk− 1,
k−1∑
=q+1
vk ≥
k−1∑
=q+1
v if q < k− 1 and(19)
q∑
=k
vk ≤
q∑
=k
v if q > k
From weak monotonicity of f we know that for any v ∈ Y(q), q = kk− 1,
k∑
=q+1
vk ≥
k∑
=q+1
v if q < k− 1 and
q∑
=k+1
vk ≤
q∑
=k+1
v if q > k
This, together with vkk = 0, implies (19).
(ii) The proof is similar. Q.E.D.
Consider any f that satisfies weak monotonicity. From f we obtain an al-
location rule f ′ using the following procedure. First, let f ′(v) ≡ f (v) ∀v and
then make the following changes to f ′:
Step 1. Let k=K.
Step 2. If δkk−1 = 0, then for all v ∈ Y(k) such that vk = 0, let f ′(v)= k− 1.
13Throughout this proof, Y(·) and δk are defined with respect to f , and Y ′(·) and δ′k are defined
with respect to f ′.
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Step 3. Decrease k by 1. If k≥ 1, then go to Step 2; otherwise, go to Step 4.
Step 4. Let k= 1.
Step 5. If −δk−1k = v¯k, then for all v ∈ Y(k − 1) such that vk = v¯k, let
f ′(v)= k.
Step 6. Increase k by 1. If k≤K, then go to Step 5; otherwise, stop.
By Lemma 6, δkk−1 ≥ −δk−1k. Thus, if at Step 2 of the procedure, we transfer
some v from Y(k) to Y ′(k−1), then in Step 5 we will not transfer any v’s from
Y(k − 1) to Y ′(k), and vice versa. The Claim assures us that each time we
make changes to f ′ in Step 2 or 5, f ′ continues to satisfy weak monotonicity;
thus the f ′ obtained at the end of this procedure is W-Mon. By construction,
the final f ′ satisfies TBB. Furthermore, f (v)= f ′(v) for almost all v ∈D.
Let p′k =
∑k
=1 δ
′
−1 be the payment function defined in (8) with respect to f
′.
By Lemma 4, p′k implements f
′. We show that for any v ∈D, assuming truth-
ful reporting under either mechanism, the buyer’s payoffs are the same under
f or f ′ implemented with p′. Therefore, it must also be optimal to tell the
truth when f is implemented with prices p′. Let f (v) = k and f ′(v) = k′. We
establish that
k∑
=1
(v − δ′−1)=
k′∑
=1
(v − δ′−1)(20)
If k = k′, then clearly (20) is true. If instead k′ < k, then from the above
construction, v = δ′−1 = 0,  = k′ + 1k′ + 2    k. Similarly, if k′ > k,
then v = δ′−1 = v¯,  = k + 1k + 2    k′. Thus, (20) holds. Therefore,
because the prices δ′−1 truthfully implement f
′, they also truthfully imple-
ment f . Q.E.D.
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